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Abstract
We develop a quantitative model for structured microfinance instruments, which
are still regarded as an important means for refinancing microfinance institu-
tion after the financial crisis of 2008/2009. The quantitative credit risk model
presented takes into account the peculiarities of microfinance institutions and
can be used for pricing purposes and analyzing the risk inherence in different
tranches of a structured microfinance investment vehicle. Additionally, we intro-
duce an innovative pricing methodology that abstains from using the martingale
probability measure. This approach seems more appropriate for illiquid securi-
tized debt of microfinance institutions. In a realistic application we check the
robustness and demonstrate the advantages of the model presented.
Keywords: microfinance, structured products, quantitative model, MC based
pricing, risk analysis, robustness check
JEL: C63, G10, G21
∗Corresponding author. Phone: +49 941 943 2683; Fax: +49 941 943 4608.
Email addresses: gregor.dorfleitner@wiwi.uni-regensburg.de (G. Dorfleitner),
christopher.priberny@wiwi.uni-regensburg.de (C. Priberny)
Preprint submitted to 2nd European Research Conference on Microfinance March 16, 2011
1. Introduction
While a few years ago microcredit was mainly seen as a means to reduce
poverty and boost the economies of developing countries, it has now become an
increasingly attractive investment opportunity. As Lensink et al. (2010) points
out, adding microfinance funds to a portfolio consisting of international bonds
and stocks yields diversification gains. Furthermore investors might profit from
an additional social return.1 The investment instruments at hand are stocks,
bonds, microfinance investment funds (MFIFs) and microfinance collateralized
debt obligations (MiCDOs).2
Taxonomies of structured microfinance vary: According to Byström (2007)
structured microfinance is defined as direct and indirect securitization. Di-
rect refers to the securitization of a microcredit portfolio by the MFI itself.
An example is the “BRAC Micro Credit Securitization Series I Trust” by the
Bangladeshian MFI BRAC3. As opposed to this, indirect securitization means
the securitization of a portfolio of debt instruments issued by MFIs. The in-
direct transactions are more frequent than the direct ones. One example for
the indirect type is the “BlueOrchard Microfinance Securities I” which was the
first MiCDO ever issued. However, using the example of the European Fund for
Southeast Europe (EFSE), Glaubitt et al. (2008) show how structured elements
can also be applied to MFIFs. This supports the broader definition by Jobst
(2010), who identifies three forms of structured microfinance, namely MFIFs,
direct securitization or local issuance, and indirect securitization or external
issuance, all of which we comprise by the term “structured microfinance invest-
ment vehicle” (SMIV). In any case the instrument has a CDO-type cash flow
structure implying that the SMIV holds a pool of debt instruments on the asset
side of the balance sheet and several tranches on the liability side. The accru-
ing cash flows of the pool are distributed to the investors, i.e. the holders of
the tranches, according to an a-priori fixed scheme with regard to the different
seniorities of the tranches, ranging from the highest ranked senior tranche to
equity at the bottom. The first losses in the asset pool affect the equity tranche.
After this tranche is eliminated the other tranches are hit.
Structured microfinance entails several advantages often cited in literature
in the context of MiCDOs, which we shortly want to summarize in the following.
According to Glaubitt et al. (2008) structured microfinance can reduce reg-
ulatory capital, as MFIs securitize parts of their loan portfolio. However this
holds true only for direct securitizations.
MFIs can profit from improved access to capital markets. Compared to
commercial bonds the volume of MFI bond issues is considerably smaller, which
makes it more difficult for MFIs to refinance themselves by utilizing the interna-
tional capital markets. Pooling the smaller liabilities of MFIs is a means to reach
1Cf. Dorfleitner et al. (2010b).
2See Dorfleitner et al. (2010a) for an overview.
3Cf. Hüttenrauch and Schneider (2008).
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a customary size. Another aspect is that MFIs are often rated lower than insti-
tutions of equal credit risk in developed countries due to higher country specific
risks4, which makes MFI bonds less interesting for institutional investors. By
participating in a SMIV the MFI can separate its credit risk from the country
risk and thereby also attain improved access to capital markets. This improve-
ment allows MFIs to diversify their founding resources.5 According to Watson
(2009) MFIs were financed by middle- to long-term debt with an average share
of 36,2% in 2009. If this part of the debt is refinanced only by some few lenders
the MFIs can be affected by serious financial distress if one of these is not willing
to endure their engagement.
Glaubitt et al. (2008) suggest that MFIs can acquire reputation on inter-
national capital markets by joining MiCDOs issued by recognized financial in-
stitutions. Due to the tranching process different risk-return profiles can be
created from a relatively homogeneous asset pool. This helps to attract new
investors, whose individual risk preferences can be met more easily.6 According
to Byström (2008) structured microfinance also helps to overcome the asymmet-
ric information problem introduced by Akerlof (1970) as “lemon phenomenon”,
which is particularly evident in microfinance. Since publicly available infor-
mation is very limited for individual investors they in turn demand additional
premia for compensation. This problem can be mitigated if the much better
informed issuer invests in the equity tranche and hence signals that he is willing
to take the most risky part himself.
All of these advantages contributed to the development that has made struc-
tured products, in particular MiCDOs, the preferred investment vehicle in mi-
crofinance in recent years.7 However, due to the global financial crisis8, the
issuing of structured microfinance products did become impossible in 2009 (Lit-
tlefield and Kneiding (2009)) and it seemed unclear whether there was any future
to this kind of refinancing instrument. Nevertheless Dorfleitner et al. (2010a)
reveal in a survey addressed to relevant world-wide experts on investing in mi-
crofinance that structured microfinance is still regarded as a very important
means for refinancing microcredit lending. In Section 2 we introduce a quanti-
tative credit risk model for MFI debt instruments, which can be used for pricing
and the risk analyzing of the tranches of a SMIV by performing MC simulation.
We develop a modular concept in the sense of an easy-to-use toolbox for SMIV
analysis. Section 3 provides an application of this model to a realistic SMIV
consisting of a MFI bond portfolio. Section 4 concludes.
4Cf. Glaubitt et al. (2008).
5Cf. Glaubitt et al. (2008).
6Cf. Byström (2008).
7Cf. Jobst (2008).
8See Dwyer and Tkac (2009) for an general overview of the financial crisis 2008. Dooley
and Hutchison (2009) shows how emerging markets were affected by the financial crisis.
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2. A quantitative model for structured microfinance
Default risk modeling of a microcredit portfolio in general should consider the
peculiarities of microcredits, namely the small nominal amounts for each loan,
the aim of stimulating productive activities and the often missing collateral.
Further properties that can often be observed empirically are high interest rates,
low default rates, a greater number of loans assigned to women than men and
lower default rates for female borrowers.
However, since most of the SMIVs like MFIFs and MiCDOs are indirect
investment instruments, we restrict our quantitative model to a portfolio of
debt instruments of MFIs. Therefore the above-mentioned properties are only
of indirect importance and we rather have to capture peculiarities of MFIs as
obligors, namely the low correlation with worldwide stock markets9, a large
variety in profitability, and a possible geographical dependence of MFIs active
in the same region induced for example by climatic risks10. In our model we try
to capture these properties.
The model that we develop in this section serves the purpose of being the
basis for Monte Carlo simulations, i.e. applying the model for risk analysis or
the valuation of tranches is done by simulating cash flows of the structured
instrument according to the model.
First we will develop a basic version of the structured instruments’ cash flow
model. In a second subsection we will discuss variations and extensions of this
model.
2.1. The basic model
We start with a set of n obligors (MFIs) whose debt instruments (loans or
bonds), which we refer to as the asset pool, are held by the structured instru-
ment. All cash flows originated by the asset pool are distributed to the tranche
owners via an a-priori fixed distribution scheme following the so-called water-
fall principle. As the cash flows of the asset pool in turn depend only on the
possible defaults of the obligors, the default times of the asset pool and their
dependency structure are crucial for an exact description of cash flows received
by the tranche owners.
Modeling dependent default times. Our considerations build on the modern ap-
proach presented by Bluhm and Overbeck (2007), which is based on factor
models11 and uses copulae for modelling the dependency structure between in-
dividual obligors, as frequently demanded by various authors.12
The model can be summarized as follows. The PD term structure captures
the probability of default over time and is obligor specific. We denote the PD
9Cf. Krauss and Walter (2010).
10Cf. Churchill and Frankiewicz (2006).
11Cf. Crouhy et al. (2000), Gordy (2000), Gordy (2003),Vasicek (1987).
12Cf. Bluhm and Overbeck (2007), Choros et al. (2009), Lando (2004), Lucas et al. (2006),
Schönbucher (2003), Mounfield (2008).
4
term structure of obligor i by t 7→ Fi(t) := PD(t)i with i = 1, . . . , n. This
function captures the probability that obligor i defaults within the given time
interval [0, t]. The question of how to specify the PD term structure is treated




where F−1i is the inverse of Fi and CWIi is a time-independent latent ran-
dom variable called the credit worthiness index corresponding to obligor i. The
symbol N denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal
distribution.
To capture the default dependence between the obligors the variable CWIi
is modeled linearly dependent on a systematic and an idiosyncratic risk com-
ponent. The systematic factor is denoted by Ψc, which can be interpreted as a
macroeconomic measure of the country c. This means that





with c(i) denoting the country to which obligor i belongs and
Ψc(i) ∈ {Ψ1, . . . ,ΨC} .
The parameter αi is determined as the square root of the R-squared ob-
tained by a linear regression of the obligor’s i asset returns against the returns
corresponding to the same time interval of the macroeconomic variable.
It is assumed that the residuals εi are independent and identically distributed
and also independent of the systematic factor Ψc(i). For the calculation of the
default time τi according to equation (1) the variable CWIi must be standard
normally distributed. To this end we make specific assumptions concerning the
distributions of systematic factor and residuals, namely
Ψc(i) ∼ N(0, 1) and εi ∼ N(0, 1− α2i ) . (3)
Note that by the construction given the CWIi follows a standard normal
distribution and N(CWIi) follows a uniform distribution on [0, 1].
It is common practice in credit risk modeling to use a country specific stock
index as macroeconomic variable Ψc(i).
13 However, this approach is not suitable
for the context of microfinance for the following reason. According to Krauss
and Walter (2010), who used MFI-data from 1998 to 2006, one can expect a
very low dependence between the returns of MFIs and country specific or even
global stock indices. Krauss and Walter (2010) also indicate that stock indices
of developing countries are often dominated by only a few larger companies and
therefore poorly reflect the country’s economical development and are often not
published by financial data providers like e.g. Thomson Financial Datastream.
13Cf. Bluhm and Overbeck (2007).
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Therefore, in our context using stock indices (if available) as systematic fac-
tors would result in αi estimates close to zero, which in turn leads to an approxi-
mate independence between the different obligors. This would have a distorting
impact on the model, because diversification effects would be overestimated.
As a solution to this problem we suggest a self-constructed MFI index for
each country. In particular, a capital-weighted return-on-equity index ROEX(t)















i representing the book value
14 of obligor’s i equity and analogously
ROE
(t)
i as the rate of return on equity. The alpha factors of the MFIs with
respect to each country’s ROEX can be derived via linear regression, where αi
equals the square root of the regression’s R-squared15.
Alternatively, one can replace the equity with asset values, which are widely
acknowledged in credit risk modeling due to the pioneering work of Merton
(1974). An appropriate return-on-assets index ROAX(t) is constructed analo-
gously to equation (4) with substituting the returns on equity by the returns on
assets and the equity values by the asset values.
Furthermore we take into account the dependency structure of the system-
atic factors by assuming a multivariate normal distribution NC with covariance
matrix ΓC .
Cash flow distribution. As already mentioned, the owner’s cash flows are deter-
mined by the dependent default times τi of the asset pool’s debt instruments
and the SMIV’s distribution scheme. Every debt instrument in the portfolio has
a particular cash profile depending on whether and when it defaults. A typical
bond’s profile may for instance be the following.
• If no default occurs during time to maturity then the coupon payment
takes place in every period t (including T ) as well as the repayment of the
nominal at maturity T .
• If a default occurs during time to maturity then the coupon payments
in the periods before default time τi take place but no more payments
16
afterwards.
The distribution scheme works as follows. The pool’s incoming cash flows are
distributed top-down according to every tranche’s seniority. This means that
14As the market value of MFI equity is often not observable due to the lack of public trading,
we use the book value as a proxy.
15Cf. Bluhm and Overbeck (2007, p. 125).
16We do without a recovery payment in order to keep things simple. But for more precise
results we recommend implementing a microfinance specific recovery rate.
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after deducting a non-obligatory management fee the remaining cash flows are
used to pay each tranche an a-priori committed payment following the cascade-
principle. The cash remaining is retained by the equity tranche. Consequently,
the equity tranche suffers the first losses caused by defaulting obligors before the
more senior tranches are affected. Due to the focus on cash-based instruments
in microfinance17, realizing losses is equivalent to a reduction of a tranche’s
nominal value.
The remaining nominal of tranche κ at time t is defined as N
(t)
κ and can be
described with regard to the upper attachment points UAPκ and lower LAPκ
attachment point and the (cumulated) portfolio loss L
(t)
P at time t:
N (t)κ = N
(0)
κ − L(t)κ (5)
with N (0)κ = (UAPκ − LAPκ) ·N
(0)
P









P is the nominal value of the portfolio at time of initiation
and L
(t)
κ the realized tranche loss at time t.
According to the seniority and therefore to the inherent risk a fixed rate is
arranged initially between the SPV and the tranche owners. Then the pool’s
cash flow is distributed each period t, here quarters, in the following way.
First of all management fees are conducted, then the senior tranche receives
a payment which equals the fixed tranche rate r1 times the remaining nominal
N
(t)
1 . Then the remaining cash is used to pay the following tranches analogously
according to the waterfall principle. The equity tranche instead receives the
complete cash that remains after the distribution. Additionally, at maturity
every tranche’s remaining nominal is repaid.
One advantage of the model is the modular concept. Thus one can easily
implement different specifications for the PD term structure and the dependence
modeling. In the next subsection we present some model extensions.
2.2. Further model elements and extensions
Copulae as an alternative for modeling dependency structures. In credit risk,
particularly in CDO-modeling, copula based approaches have become popular
in recent years.18 One reason for this development is that according to the
Sklar (1959) any multivariate distribution can be described by its marginals
and a suitable copula function which allows modelers to use distributions closer
to the real one as standard approaches.
Here we present two important copula functions and show how these can be
integrated in the model.19
17Because the raising of funds and not regulatory benefits is in the center of interest.
18Cf. Bluhm and Overbeck (2007), Choros et al. (2009), Lando (2004), Mounfield (2008),
Lucas et al. (2006), Schönbucher (2003).
19The notation used is based on Bluhm and Overbeck (2007).
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Gaussian copula
The Gaussian copula is equivalent to the multivariate normal distribution
Nm used in the core-model with correlation matrix Γ in which the inverses of
the univariate normal distribution N−1 are inserted.
Cn,Γ(u1, . . . , un) = Nn[N
−1(u1), . . . , N
−1(un); Γ] (6)
Gaussian copulas are often used20 as they are easy to implement, because
the correlation matrix Γ is the only parameter to be estimated. Because of the
lack of tail dependence the use of Gaussian copulas could lead to errors in cash
flow mapping, as the probability of extreme events is underestimated.
Student-t copula
As the Student-t copula equals the multivariate t-distribution ΘΓ,d with
correlation matrix Γ and d degrees of freedom in which the inverses of the
univariate t-distribution Θ−1d have been inserted, it entails fatter tails. This
copula is defined as:
Cn,Γ,d(u1, . . . , un) = Θn,Γ,d[Θ
−1
d (u1), . . . ,Θ
−1
d (un)] . (7)
With increasing d the Student-t copula converges to the multivariate normal
distribution. The integration into our model is done using the link function21
CWIt−copulai =
√




X with X ∼ χ2(d) . (8)
and CWIi defined as the original latent variable of the basic model (2) are
mixed with additional χ2(d)-distributed random variables.22 As CWIt−copulai





i )] . (9)
Specification of the PD term structure. As mentioned above the PD term struc-
ture t 7→ PD(t)i describes the distribution of the default times of obligor i.
Markov chains are often used in this context because they allow us to model the
future dependent solely on the last observed state.23 We present two different
approaches using Markov chains.
The first and most straight-forward approach is the exponential distribu-
tion in the form of
PD
(t)
i = 1− e
−t·PDi (10)
20Cf. Choros et al. (2009), Finger (2000), Bluhm and Overbeck (2007).
21Cf. Bluhm and Overbeck (2007, p. 127).
22The calculation of CWIi is the same as in the basic model. So the ROE factors are
still multivariate normally distributed and the assumptions on the parameter distributions
(Equation 3) are valid as well.
23Cf. Kreinin and Sidelnikova (2001), Bluhm and Overbeck (2007).
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where PDi is an default intensity parameter capturing the continuous propen-
sity to default. The idea behind this formula is that the probability of default of
obligor i for a given time horizon is constant no matter how long the preceding
history without a default is.
A second approach is the time-homogeneous, continuous Markov chain ap-
proach HCTMC approach presented by Bluhm and Overbeck (2007). It is a
generalization of the exponential distribution term structure where we only have
two states (default, non-default). HCTMC captures changes in the obligor’s
creditworthiness represented by rating changes. This feature is an important
advantage because rating changes can be observed very often as opposed to real
defaults. We start considering a rating migration matrix as published every
year by all major rating agencies24. As an example Table 1 displays the rating
migration matrix of Fitch Rating.
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCCtoC Default
AAA 94.90 5.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AA 0.08 91.65 7.84 0.35 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.04
A 0.02 2.34 92.48 4.73 0.21 0.07 0.06 0.09
BBB 0.00 0.24 4.29 90.70 3.71 0.53 0.24 0.28
BB 0.03 0.06 0.16 8.53 80.63 7.20 1.83 1.55
B 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.72 10.62 82.07 4.34 1.99
CCCtoC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 1.08 19.46 54.59 24.59
Table 1: Fitch’s global rating migration matrix for the period 1990-2008 (data in %) according
to FitchRating (2009)
Every line displays relative frequencies of one-year rating migrations based
on corporate bond data from 1990 to 2008. We use these historical rating
migrations as a proxy for the real transition probabilities from the rating in the
first column to the other rating classes. We are still interested in the continuous
PD term structure by taking into account the probabilities of different stages
between the default.
Since we consider a continuous time setting we need to calculate a Markov
generator Q that satisfies the following equation25:
MM (1)
!
= exp(Q ∗ 1) . (11)
The PD term structure PD
(t)




i = [exp(tQ)]l,m (12)
where l is the row of the initial rating of obligor i and m is the last column,
which represents the default stage. Figure 1 shows the PD term structures
derived from Fitch’s rating migration matrix for all of the initial rating classes.
24These are Fitch Rating, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investor Service.
25For an overview of how to calculate Markov generators see Kreinin and Sidelnikova (2001).
26Cf. Bluhm and Overbeck (2007).
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Figure 1: PD term structures based on the HCTMC approach using Fitch’s rating migration
matrix(Tabelle 1)
Risk-neutral tranche pricing. The basic model does not yet make any statements
on the valuation or on determining the spreads of the different tranches. In this
subsection we develop a possible extension for calculating credit spreads for
senior and mezzanine tranches of a SMIV on the assumption that they are
supposed to be priced to par.
It is well-known that investors demand risk premia for accepting credit risk.
There are several ways to take these risk premia into account. The standard
approach in derivative pricing is to use a risk neutral probability measure and
then to take expectations. This methodology that is based on arbitrage-free
pricing is also standard in CDO valuation in the form of risk neutral probabili-
ties of default. According to Duffie and Singleton (2003, p. 101) the risk neutral
probabilities of default are chosen in a way such that the market price equals
the present value of the expected cash flows discounted with the risk free inter-
est rate. It should be indicated that the PD term structures introduced in the
previous subsection describe the physical, actually observable values, which are
remarkably lower than the risk neutral ones because the demanded risk com-
pensation has to be covered. When doing MC simulation and pricing a tranche
we can discount the cash flow profile of each path derived by using a risk neutral
10
PD term structure simply with the risk free interest rate. In a second step, an
averaging over all paths approximates taking the expectation and thus yields
the price of a specific tranche.
Bluhm and Overbeck (2007, p. 268) show a way of deriving the risk neutral
PD
(t)
i,rn from any physical PD term structure PD
(t)
i with regard to a proxy for






















i,rn can be derived from suitable spreads of one-year credit
default swaps. This suggestion is a comfortable way to get a hold of risk neutral
PD term structures in line with the HCTMC-approach, but it causes some
hurdles that are difficult to overcome in an empirical application, especially in
microfinance, due to the lack of corresponding CDS data. As there are no CDS
for MFIs, further assumptions are necessary.
Using the PD
(t)
i,rn a tranche is priced, if the present value of the expected
loss equals the expected cash flows caused by the spread.
T∑
t=1






where Sκ is the spread of tranche κ, η is the payment period
27 and δ(t) is
the discount factor. The expected values E(.) are calculated as mean of the
simulation data.












A pricing approach based on risk analysis. Given a specific SMIV with fixed
spreads of the tranches and given an interest rate term structure one can still
price tranches of the instrument by using the above risk-neutral pricing ap-
proach. However, we rather suggest using the real-world PD term structure
and considering the risk explicitly for several reasons: CDS spreads for deriv-
ing risk neutral PDs are not available for MFIs. One can use a proxy for the
same rating class but then the MFI is forced into resembling companies from a
completely different industry. The risk neutral approach assumes no-arbitrage
pricing which is not possible with the illiquid debt titles of MFIs. Furthermore
microfinance investors need not necessarily behave in a neoclassical way. They
might want to have a look at the complete risk profile of a tranche and then set
27In the following we set the payment period to 0.25, which equals 4 interest payments per
year.
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their price and the risk premium individually. They also might include a social
return in their considerations28.
For that purpose we use a MC based risk analysis in the spirit of Hertz
(1964), where we use different risk measures such as the value-at-risk (VaR)
and the shortfall probability with regard to the internal rate of return (IRR).
With an suitable iterative algorithm we can derive tranche specific spreads
using the the IRR distribution, so that the tranches are priced at par. Our
approach is based on the view of an investor in a particular SMIV tranche.
For optimizing her return she uses as much debt as possible to refinance the
investment. The amount of equity needed depends on the risk of the tranche’s
specific cash flows. Taking into account the IRR distribution, the minimum
equity ratio w needed to allow a maximum debt financing is driven only by the
yearly debt interest rate rd and the probability that the investor defaults on
debt services PDinv at the end of the investment period T in a way that
wκ =
rd,T −min [Qκ,T (PDinv), rd,T ]
1 + rd,T
(16)
with rd,T symbolizing the time-to-maturity interest rate on debt and with
Qκ,T (PDinv) representing the quantile function of the T -years IRR distribution
of tranche κ and with PDinv as the investor-specific T -year default probability
for the investment into the tranche. The investment in the SMIV tranche is
therefore only profitable for the investor, if
µκ ≥ wκ · re + (1− wκ) · rd = waccκ (17)
with µκ as the expected IRR of tranche κ and re representing the return on
equity the investor is able to receive from alternative risky investments. Note
that at this spot alternative views on re as compared to the standard CAPM-
based approach, which might be due to investors’ social responsibility, could
easily be implemented and made transparent.
With the micro foundation of an individual investor’s calculus in equation
(17) we can formulate the whole SMIV pricing problem as follows: Choose the




s.t. µκ ≥ wκ · re + (1− wκ) · rd for κ < K − 1 (19)
It is obvious that the expected 1-year IRR of the equity tranche µK reaches
the maximum when each µκ of the superior tranches equals waccκ.
In contrast to the risk neutral pricing approach presented above this ap-
proach is also economically quite intuitive. Whereas the other approach above
uses (often under critically assumptions) market-implied risk neutral PDs as
28Cf. Dorfleitner et al. (2010b).
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main drivers for spreads, we recommend a sensible individual calculus based
on re and rd with a corresponding PDinv. We see our approach in line with
Wilmott (2009), who suggests making models not too complicated and putting
them on a sound empirical basis. Furthermore the approach allows, in con-
trast to risk neutral pricing, easily made adoptions in the cash flow distribution
scheme.
In addition to pricing purposes this analysis is a well-suited tool for making
risk inherence apparent and therefore it can be used in risk management.
Check for robustness. It is clear that the estimation of the input parameters, in
particular of the correlation matrix Γ, may suffer due to relatively short time
series for MFIs. Additionally, it can also be less reliable because it is taken from
balance sheet data that may be biased. For this reason we suggest checking the
robustness of the model against an erroneous Γ by adding a random error to
the ROEX indices. This can be achieved in our simulation based approach by





c · eν (20)
where ν is a normal distributed random variable. With this extension we
are in line with Wilmott (2009) who requires financial models to be made more
robust as one lesson learned from the financial crisis of 2008/2009. Furthermore
one can use the difference in the resulting IRR distributions to derive a risk
premium for the model risk inherence. We regard this as a responsible way of
dealing with the still evident problem of data availability in microfinance.
A multi-factor extension incorporating climatic risk. In credit risk modeling it
is also common to extend equation (2) with industry factors. Since MFIs belong
to only one industry the more important question would be whether MFIs lend
their money mostly to one type of entrepreneurial activity. The most important
type could be agricultural activity, where we have a strong influence of the
weather. Therefore it is natural to assume the credit risk of MFIs as dependent
on the credit exposure in the agricultural sector, which in turn is dependent on
the weather. In this sense we suggest a multi-factor extension also comprising
a local weather index variable, namely
CWIi = αi





with Ψc(i) ∼ N(0, 1), Ξc(i) ∼ N(0, 1), εi ∼ N(0, 1 − α2i ) and Ξc(i) repre-
senting the weather index for country c(i). The weights yi and zi represent
the strength of the influence of both factors. We let yi equal the incremental
contribution of factor one to the R-squared of a regression of the ROEX on
both factors divided by the corresponding incremental contribution of factor
two and vi equal to 1. This is a generalization of the approach by Bluhm and
Overbeck (2007), who set both weights equal to 1. As above, αi is the root of
13
the R-squared of the regression comprising both factors.
The model does not necessarily need to be restricted to a special weather
index. However, according to World-Bank (2005) growing degree days are a
common index in the agricultural sector and a biologically accurate measure for
growing activity of grains and fruits. Therefore we use a growing-degree-day




max(ϑd − L; 0) (22)
with ϑd denoting the daily average temperature, L the critical threshold tem-
perature under which no growing activity is observable, and D the number of
days in the year under consideration.
3. Empirical Application
In this section we show how the model developed in the previous section
can be used in a realistic application. For that purpose we arrange a SMIV
like a plain vanilla CDO or a structured MFIF. In this example we first derive
the risk neutral tranche spreads for the upper tranches. As we see, this part
cannot be carried out without extensive assumptions. Alternatively we then
calculate the spreads by the risk analysis based approach that we introduced
above. Nevertheless we take the risk neutral spreads as given by the market in
the next steps, where we show the risk inherence in each tranche by analyzing
the simulated internal rate of returns (IRR) on the basis of the one and two
factor case and check for the robustness of the model.
SMIV structure. To keep the example simple, the SMIV considered consists
only of senior, mezzanine and equity tranche. The exact structure and the
attachment points are shown in Table 2.




Table 2: Structure of the SMIV
For the underlying asset pool we assume that it consists entirely of bullet
bonds with identical time to maturity to the SMIV, namely five years with
quarterly interest payments. The obligors are existing Latin American MFIs
having been assigned a commercial rating of Fitch Ratings which is necessary
for applying the HCTMC-approach.29
29For unrated MFIs we would recommend using the exponential PD term structure with
estimated one year PDs.
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MFI Country Rating Exposure LGD R2E R
2
A PDrn (1 Year) Coupon
AgroCapital BO BBB 2,000 1 0.68094 0.82289 0.00638 0.05912
BancoSol BO A 3,400 1 0.82168 0.65359 0.00374 0.05612
CRECER BO BBB 1,100 1 0.84264 0.83954 0.00638 0.05901
FIE BO A 4,500 1 0.52401 0.27703 0.00374 0.05613
Fundacin MICROS GT B 7,500 1 0.14992 0.10802 0.03151 0.10961
CompartamosBanco MX AA 10,000 1 0.09191 0.52474 0.00223 0.05132
BANEX (Ex FINDESA) NI BBB 4,600 1 0.01467 0.82220 0.00638 0.05907
FAMA NI BBB 4,900 1 0.52147 0.00003 0.00638 0.05895
EDPYME Crear Are-
quipa
PE B 7,000 1 0.27352 0.62926 0.03151 0.10949
SUM 45,000
Table 3: Portfolio structure of the SMIV (Exposure in 1000 USD)
The portfolio of MFI bonds is displayed in Table 3. The information on the
MFIs stems from MixMarket, a web-based platform providing lots of data on
MFIs. Each debt instrument’s share of the pool is chosen with respect to the
obligor’s rating and the aim of balancing the overall investment per country. We
take a USD investor’s perspective and realistically assume that the bonds are
issued in USD. Since MFIs are not expected to have lots of accessible collateral
we assume recovery payment of zero, which equals a loss given default (LGD)
of 1. This assumption can of course easily be relaxed. The value of R2E (R
2
A)
is derived by linear regression with the MFIs ROE (ROA) as dependent and
the ROEX (ROAX) index (see Table 4) as an independent variable. The risk
neutral 1-year PDs are estimated from Itraxx-Data of equivalent rated CDS
provided by Giaccherini and Pepe (2008)30. As the Itraxx contains no B rated
CDS the corresponding risk neutral PD is estimated by regression with log PDs
and extrapolation. Finally we assume the single bonds to be priced at par and
therefore derive the coupons on the basis of simulation.
The pool’s cash flows after deducting a realistic management fee of 1,3119%
p.a.31 are distributed following the cascade principle according to seniority:
The upper tranches receive the risk free interest rate (2,79% p.a.)32 plus spread
on the remaining nominal and the equity tranche acquires the residuals. At
maturity each tranche receives up to the remaining nominal.
The ROEX (ROAX) indices are calculated based on all MFIs for which
information about equity, ROE, assets and ROA has been available from Mix-
Market for at least three years.33 Our results for Bolivia (BO), Guatemala
(GT), Mexico (MX), Nicaragua (NI) und Peru (PE) are shown in Table 4 and
the corresponding correlation matrix ΓC estimated by the standard procedure
30In particular we used the mean of risk neutral PDs of equal rated CDSs. This step is quite
critical as we “mix” the Risk neutral PDs of different industries, which shows once again the
problems inherent in this method.
31This equals the EFSE’s management fees in 2007 with regard to European Fund for South-
east Europe (2007).
32This is equivalent to the 5 year Treasury bond yield for 11.06.2009 (Source: Thomson
Datastream).
33Note that a lot more (at least 18 per country) MFIs than the ones participating in the
SMIV contribute to these indices.
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in Table 5 which is required as a parameter of the multivariate normal distri-
bution. The resulting ROAX time series are presented in Table A.11 and the
correlation matrix in Table A.12 in the Appendix.
ROEX(BO) ROEX(GT) ROEX(MX) ROEX(NI) ROEX(PE)
2007 0.159644 0.095693 0.302575 0.190256 0.259006
2006 0.130380 0.061891 0.309043 0.217373 0.271205
2005 0.131750 0.021587 0.289835 0.226171 0.316358
2004 0.145820 0.065640 0.365253 0.172658 0.266086
2003 0.130886 0.063580 0.527800 0.117495 0.274590
2002 0.056725 0.095500 0.495148 0.099309 0.339920
2001 0.007760 0.042900 0.363944 0.113040 0.214262
2000 0.007808 0.049900 0.444282 0.139155 0.144459
1999 0.051953 0.229200 0.163467 0.140115 0.077709
Table 4: Country specific ROEX
ROEX(BO) ROEX(GT) ROEX(MX) ROEX(NI) ROEX(PE)
ROEX(BO) 1.0000 -0.1449 -0.1121 0.6502 0.5359
ROEX(GT) -0.1449 1.0000 -0.5219 -0.2423 -0.6102
ROEX(MX) -0.1121 -0.5219 1.0000 -0.5357 0.4663
ROEX(NI) 0.6502 -0.2423 -0.5357 1.0000 0.2159
ROEX(PE) 0.5359 -0.6102 0.4663 0.2159 1.0000
Table 5: Correlation matrix ΓC of the ROEX
As we wish to model the PD term structure according to the HCTMC-
approach we need to derive a Markov generator Q with regard to Fitch’s rating
migration matrix (see Table 1). We do this by following Kreinin and Sidelnikova
(2001)34.
Risk neutral pricing. Now that the structure of the SMIV and its input param-
eters have been clarified we can derive the spreads of the superior tranches so
that the tranches are priced at par. We start by analyzing the generation of
different cash flow scenarios with Monte Carlo simulation. Then we derive the
tranche spreads based on risk neutral pricing. For this purpose, the following
steps have to be taken:
1. Derive the risk neutral PD term structure of each MFI i from the phys-
ical PD term structure calculated by the HCTMC approach and the risk
neutral one-year PD by following (13).
2. MC-simulate the pool’s cash flows in the following way:
34In particular we used the “weighted adjustment” for its superior adaptability compared
to “diagonal adjustment”.
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(a) Generate the random variables εi and Ψ1, ...,ΨC with regard to the
multivariate normal distribution of systematic factors NC with co-
variance matrix ΓC .
(b) Calculate the CWIi following equation (2).
(c) Calculate the dependent default times τi by inserting the CWIi into
the inverse of the risk neutral PD term structure.
(d) Derive the pool’s cash flows determined by the default times τi.
3. Calculate each tranche’s expected remaining nominal value N
(t)
κ following
equation (5) and occurring losses for each t. Repeat 2. and 3. many times.
4. Calculate the risk-neutral spreads for the senior and mezzanine tranche
according to equation (15).
To achieve an appropriate approximation to the real distribution we used
106 simulation runs. As result of our simulation we receive these calculated
spreads: 15.1 bp for senior and 397.2 bp for the mezzanine tranche. Note again,
that this approach requires a mainstream rating and is therefore only applicable
a limited number of MFIs.
Pricing based on risk analysis. More suitable for MFIs might be the pricing
methodology based on risk analysis introduced above, that abstains form using
proxies for risk neutral PDs as those are not observable for MFI debt. Therefore
also a mainstream rating is no longer required, if a more simple term structure
like the exponential distribution is used and the corresponding PDs are esti-
mated individually on basis of suitable values like write-off ratio, gross portfolio
yield and microfinance specific ratings.
However as the sample portfolio contains only MFIs with Fitch rating we
keep using the HCTMC while demonstrating our pricing approach, which con-
tains the following steps:
1. MC-simulate the pool’s cash flows in the following way:
(a) Generate the random variables εi and Ψ1, ...,ΨC with regard to the
multivariate normal distribution of systematic factors NC with co-
variance matrix ΓC .
(b) Calculate the CWIi following equation (2).
(c) Calculate the dependent default times τi by inserting CWIi into the
inverse of the real-world PD term structure.
(d) Derive the pool’s cash flows determined by the default times τi. Re-
peat a) to d) many times.
2. Derive spread for senior tranche S1 using the following iterative algo-
rithm35:
(a) Calculate the tranche’s cash flows depending on the distribution
scheme and the IRR of each tranche.
(b) Calculate the fictitious equity ratio w according to equation (16).
35We set the start-value of S1 = 0.
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(c) Check: If waccκ ≈ µκ then terminate; otherwise adjust S1 by adding
waccκ − µκ and repeat.
3. Reduce simulated pool’s cash flows by payments to senior tranche holders
based on S1.
4. Derive spread for mezzanine tranche S2 by repeating 2. analogously using
the from 3. resulting cash flow distribution.
To achieve an appropriate approximation to the real distribution we used
106 simulation runs. Furthermore we set re equal 8.0% and rd to be 3.0% with a
corresponding PDinv = 0.2815%.
36 As result of our simulation we receive these
calculated spreads: 17.6 bp for senior and 554.5 bp for the mezzanine tranche.
Analyzing the tranche’s risk. In the following we assume the risk neutral spreads
to be existent and analyze the risk inherence in the different tranches of the
SMIV. It should be mentioned once again that we use the real-world PD term
structure for this purpose as opposed to the risk-neutral pricing approach.
In order to simulate the tranches’ cash flows with regard to (pseudo-)random
multivariate default times the following steps have to be conducted:
1. Generate the random variables εi and Ψ1, ...,ΨC with regard to the mul-
tivariate normal distribution of systematic factors NC with covariance
matrix ΓC .
2. Calculate the CWIi following equation (2).
3. Calculate the dependent default times τi by inserting CWIi into the in-
verse of the real-world PD term structure.
4. Derive the pool’s cash flows determined by the default times τi.
5. Calculate each tranche’s cash flows depending on the distribution scheme
and the IRR of each tranche. Repeat 1. to 5. many times.
Tranches “VaR (90%)” “VaR (99%)” SFP (¡ 0) Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
senior 0.02980 0.02980 0.00042 -0.16490 0.02980 0.02980 0.02975 0.02980 0.02980
mezz. 0.02922 -0.14229 0.02273 -1.00000 0.06942 0.06942 0.05600 0.06942 0.06942
equity -0.13925 -0.24698 0.23540 -0.93780 0.04819 0.22150 0.13700 0.22150 0.22150
Table 6: Simulation results basic model using ROEX: Risk measures and descriptive analysis
of the IRRs of the tranches
Tranches “VaR (90%)” “VaR (99%)” SFP (¡ 0) Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
senior 0.02980 0.02980 0.00021 -0.05811 0.02980 0.02980 0.02977 0.02980 0.02980
mezz. 0.02922 -0.24136 0.02759 -1.00000 0.06942 0.06942 0.05479 0.06942 0.06942
equity -0.13925 -0.25573 0.23829 -0.80560 0.03164 0.22150 0.13330 0.22150 0.22150
Table 7: Simulation results basic model using ROAX: Risk measures and descriptive analysis
of the IRRs of the tranches
36This equals the 5-years PD of an AA rated obligor calculated on basis of the HCTMC
approach.
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Figure 2: Histograms and Log-Histograms of the IRRκ (Basic Model using ROEX)
In Table 6 we present the “VaR” of the IRRs at the 99% and the 90% level
and also the probability of receiving an IRR smaller than 0% (also shortfall
probability or SFP) as results of our simulations. In addition it shows the stan-
dard descriptive measures of the IRR distribution for a better overview. Figure
19
2 shows histograms of the entirely IRR distribution for each tranche and—as
losses occur rather rarely—also in logarithmic form. The reason for the min-
inmal IRR of mezzanine tranche being smaller than that of the equity tranche
is caused by the distribution scheme in addition to the small and very hetero-
geneous asset pool. Thus the equity tranche can, in contrast to the mezzanine
tranche, in very rare cases, still receive cash flow payments even if it has al-
ready completely defaulted upon. The reason is that in these cases only higher
rated obligors have defaulted and lower rated bonds are still paying high interest
rates.
In addition we present also the results obtained by using ROAX instead of
ROEX in Table 7 and the histograms in Figure B.3 in the appendix. Comparing
the results it appears that both indices leads to quite similar IRR distributions.
For that reason we confine to use only ROEX in the following.
Robustness check. In the next step the model presented is checked for robust-
ness against Γ errors. Therefore we interfere each set of 500 MC simulation runs
with a random entry of the REOX indices according to (20) with re-estimating
Γ in each run. For this reason, we set mean and standard deviation of Θ equal
to 0 and 0.1. For performance reasons we reduce the number of MC runs for
each of the 500 cases to 105.
The resulting barplots representing the different realizations of risk and descrip-
tive measures are shown in Figures B.5 and B.6 in the Appendix. For a better
overview we present the span between minimum and maximum realization of
each measure in Table 8. Note that only the realizations of the minimum dif-
fer by more than 1% for all tranches. Furthermore, remarkable spans are only
observable for the equity tranche’s first quartile and the mezzanine’s tranche
“VAR (99%)”. This indicates that our model reacts robustly to measurement
errors in ROEX values.
senior mezz. equity
VAR (99%) 0.00000 0.08875 0.00000
VAR (90%) 0.00000 0.00068 0.00625
SFP 0.00043 0.00409 0.00955
Min. 0.17172 0.04020 0.57310
1st Qu. 0.00000 0.00000 0.02654
Median 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Mean 0.00003 0.00124 0.00320
3rd Qu. 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Max 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Table 8: Simulation results robustness check: Span of realizations of different risk and de-
scriptive measures (values ≥ 1% in bold print)
Two factor extension. In the following we demonstrate the implementation of
a second factor. We use the GDD index for each obligor’s country calculated
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according to (22) with L equaling 10 Celsius based on the average daily temper-
ature of weather stations in the following cities: Santa Cruz (BO), Guatemala
(GT), Mexico-City (MX), Managua (NI), Lima (PE).37 The resulting GDD in-
dices are shown in Table A.13 and the correlation matrix Γ2F in Table A.14 in
the Appendix.
Table 9 now presents the R-squared values as results of linear regressions of
each obligor’s ROE on ROEX, on GDD and on both factors. Note that adding
GDD as second factor leads to higher R-squared values for many obligors, which
in turn implies an increase in the systematic risk component of the CWI.





AgroCapital BO 0.37071 0.38717 0.67453
BancoSol BO 0.68007 0.14838 0.69210
CRECER BO 0.35469 0.22276 0.48498
FIE BO 0.13932 0.04595 0.16805
Fundacin MICROS GT 0.02679 0.00793 0.03894
CompartamosBanco MX 0.00746 0.01001 0.01522
BANEX (ex FINDESA) NI 0.04377 0.53169 0.56308
FAMA NI 0.12278 0.15929 0.18924
EDPYME Crear Arequipa PE 0.45761 0.51307 0.64789
Table 9: R-squareds of linear regressions of MFI ROE with of the ROEX, GDD and both
factors
With all parameters at hand we MC simulate 106 runs according to the
following scheme:
1. Generate the random variables εi and Ψ1, ...,ΨC ,Ξ1, ...,ΞC with regard
to the multivariate normal distribution of systematic factors N2C with
correlation matrix Γ2F
2. Calculate the CWIi following (21).
3. to 5. are identical to the above procedure.
Tranches “VaR (90%)” “VaR (99%)” SFP (¡ 0) Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
senior 0.02980 0.02980 0.00196 -0.30110 0.02980 0.02980 0.02960 0.02980 0.02980
mezz. 0.02574 -0.30737 0.04904 -1.00000 0.06942 0.06942 0.04697 0.06942 0.06942
equity -0.15577 -0.27084 0.24736 -1.00000 0.00932 0.22150 0.12990 0.22150 0.22150
Table 10: Simulation results two factor extension: Risk measures and descriptive analysis of
the IRRs of the tranches
Table 10 presents the “VaR” of the IRRs to the 99% and the 90% level
as well as the shortfall probability. In addition it also shows the standard
37The data was drawn from www.wunderground.org. We solve the problem of lacking data
between February 22th 2000 and May 02th 2000 by interpolation of the accumulated GDD
for that period.
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descriptive measures of the IRR distribution for a better overview. Figure B.4
in the Appendix shows histograms of the whole IRR distribution for each tranche
and also in logarithmic form. When comparing the results with the results of
the basic model (Table 6) one can see that the risk in the mezzanine and the
equity tranche now has increased a little bit, a fact that is economically sensible
since identifying the weather risk reveals a higher default dependency. However,




In this paper we develop a quantitative model for structured microfinance
instruments, which have – like all structured instruments – suffered from the
financial crisis of 2008/2009 but are still regarded as a very important means
for refinancing microcredit lending.
As one lesson learnt from the financial crisis being that it is desirable to make
investment issues as transparent as possible, we restrict ourselves to consider-
ing structured microfinance as a real cash flow instrument without any opaque
peculiarities, a case that is very realistic in the microfinance context. The mi-
crofinance vehicle we analyze has an asset pool consisting of debt instruments
of several MFIs.
We model the joint default risk of several MFIs with a state-of-the-art factor
approach and several extensions with a special focus on peculiarities of MFIs.
Dependent on the multivariate vector of default times, that is basically the
random variable we model and MC simulate, we can construct the cash flows of
the structured instruments tranches. Even if we suggest a sophisticated model,
we make things as transparent as possible and suggest to use MFI return-on-
equity or return-on-asset indices for each country under consideration instead of
the usual stock market index. Additionally, we introduce an innovative pricing
methodology on basis of risk analysis utilizing the IRR distribution rather than
a blind trust in risk-neutral pricing approaches. Furthermore we highlight the
robustness of the model with respect to the possibility of incorrect MFI balance
sheet data. Also, the results of the risk analysis approach are relatively robust
to model variations. This implies that the suggested procedure can well be
applied in practice.
As a next step the implementation of a model that uses MFI specific values
for estimating PDs instead of mainstream ratings would allow the application of
the model presented to a major number of MFIs. One possible solution might
be seen in logit models.
In summary this paper is a supporting contribution to the future refinancing
of microcredits in general and the development of structured microfinance in
particular. We feel that this is still a promising topic for investors as well as
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Appendix A. Tables
ROAX(BO) ROAX(GT) ROAX(MX) ROAX(NI) ROAX(PE)
2007 0.022243 0.046229 0.065924 0.038628 0.035661
2006 0.019338 0.035348 0.056407 0.040687 0.039553
2005 0.019586 0.014522 0.042060 0.049511 0.050688
2004 0.019745 0.015857 0.045547 0.040164 0.035949
2003 0.022612 0.000000 0.189523 0.056177 0.047801
2002 0.015712 0.028800 0.153663 0.055239 0.051001
2001 0.006547 0.028300 0.130059 0.041417 0.026070
2000 0.006370 0.014000 0.300702 0.084657 0.033076
1999 0.012666 0.016500 0.156920 0.096670 0.020451
Table A.11: Country specific ROAX
ROAX(BO) ROAX(GT) ROAX(MX) ROAX(NI) ROAX(PE)
ROAX(BO) 1.0000 0.0495 -0.6131 -0.4895 0.5761
ROAX(GT) 0.0495 1.0000 -0.4263 -0.4464 -0.1564
ROAX(MX) -0.6131 -0.4263 1.0000 0.7072 -0.1831
ROAX(NI) -0.4895 -0.4464 0.7072 1.0000 -0.4031
ROAX(PE) 0.5761 -0.1564 -0.1831 -0.4031 1.0000
Table A.12: Correlation matrix ΓC of the ROAX
GDD(BO) GDD(GT) GDD(MX) GDD(NI) GDD(PE)
2007 4838 3525 2281 6222 3011
2006 4954 3465 2275 6297 3426
2005 4825 3523 2483 6075 3206
2004 4330 3209 2133 5538 2904
2003 4785 3531 2393 6167 3083
2002 4965 3491 2400 6097 3168
2001 4700 3354 2068 6093 2925
2000 3438 2919 1900 5553 2887
1999 4807 3250 2055 5860 3329
Table A.13: Country specific GDD indices
ROEX(BO) ROEX(GT) ROEX(MX) ROEX(NI) ROEX(PE) GDD(BO) GDD(GT) GDD(MX) GDD(NI) GDD(PE)
ROEX(BO) 1.0000 -0.1449 -0.1121 0.6502 0.5359 0.4276 0.5792 0.6306 0.3197 0.2220
ROEX(GT) -0.1449 1.0000 -0.5219 -0.2423 -0.6102 0.2253 -0.1040 -0.2521 -0.0868 0.4045
ROEX(MX) -0.1121 -0.5219 1.0000 -0.5357 0.4663 -0.2447 0.0198 0.1881 -0.0158 -0.4424
ROEX(NI) 0.6502 -0.2423 -0.5357 1.0000 0.2159 0.1396 0.2143 0.2810 0.1679 0.3546
ROEX(PE) 0.5359 -0.6102 0.4663 0.2159 1.0000 0.4464 0.6863 0.8254 0.4631 0.0417
GDD(BO) 0.4276 0.2253 -0.2447 0.1396 0.4464 1.0000 0.9045 0.7183 0.8059 0.6294
GDD(GT) 0.5792 -0.1040 0.0198 0.2143 0.6863 0.9045 1.0000 0.8943 0.8771 0.4468
GDD(MX) 0.6306 -0.2521 0.1881 0.2810 0.8254 0.7183 0.8943 1.0000 0.6695 0.4153
GDD(NI) 0.3197 -0.0868 -0.0158 0.1679 0.4631 0.8059 0.8771 0.6695 1.0000 0.5277
GDD(PE) 0.2220 0.4045 -0.4424 0.3546 0.0417 0.6294 0.4468 0.4153 0.5277 1.0000
Table A.14: Correlation matrix Γtwofactors of the ROEX and GDD
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Appendix B. Figures
















































































































Figure B.3: Histograms and Log-Histograms of the IRRTR (Basic Model using ROAX)
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Figure B.4: Histograms and Log-Histograms of the IRRκ (Two-Factor Extension)
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Figure B.5: Simulation results robustness check: Barplots of measure realizations (result of
IRR analysis in color)
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Figure B.6: Simulation results robustness check: Barplots of measure realizations (result of
IRR analysis in color)
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